Chapter 13

Police Organizations and Problem-Solving Strategies for Juvenile Intervention: Identifying Crucial Elements

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13.1 Introduction

The implementation of community policing and problem-solving strategies at the start of the 21st century has permeated the institution of policing in the United States such that there is near universal desire for police managers to be associated with these ideas (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). Part of the ethos of community policing, by some measures (Bayley, 1994), is that the agency no longer operates alone but builds partnerships to confront problems within the community.

These partnerships can include mental health services, building inspectors, community groups, and other actors focused on particular facets of the community and its problems.

This chapter centers on four departments that confronted the problem of young juvenile delinquents who were at great risk of becoming chronic delinquents. Each agency received a Byrne grant to engage in problem-solving strategies focused on juvenile crime and response development consonant with Eck and Spelman's (1987) scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA) model. In the following text, we first outline the scope of the child delinquency problem in these four cities as well as nationally — which constitutes the scanning and analysis phase of the project. Next, we turn to a broader understanding of the essential elements for building a successful intervention program or developing a response. Finally, we examine the four sites to evaluate their success in implementing interventions with community partners or, more succinctly, whether the programs crafted in each site can be considered an effective use of the problem-solving strategy. To accomplish this, attention is given to five primary characteristics of the program implementation: variety of the program partners, the extent of support within the partnership network, the level of program awareness or knowledge among partners, the complexity of the programmatic response, and the commitment to evaluation of the outcome.

13.2 Early Onset

The work of Loeber and Farrington (2001) and their collaborators on early childhood intervention (see Loeber et al., 1998) has sparked interest both in identifying child delinquents and devising treatment programs for these "early starters." Howell (2001), in particular, argues for outlining comprehensive strategies and partnerships for dealing with child delinquents. This chapter describes the efforts of four police departments in dealing with arrested child delinquents. In 1999, each department was committed to addressing the needs of arrested and adjudicated youths 13 years old and younger through specialized services.

Motor, Lakeside, Central, and Riverside cities, all located in Michigan, engaged in problem-solving efforts (Bynum et al., 2000) that identified youths between the ages of 10 and 13 with a first- or second-time, nonviolent, serious offense as being at a very high risk of becoming a serious and/or chronic delinquent. The results of the problem-solving efforts, coupled with national research from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention's (OJJDP) Study Group on Serious and

Chronic Juvenile Offenders were the impetus for implementing a delin-
quency reduction strategy in each police agency. Analysis of official data
as well as anecdotal evidence indicated that youth in this category were
often overlooked (Snyder, 1998; Schumacher and Kurz, 2000). For
example, interviews with personnel at each site indicated that dismissal
of court cases or informal probation was the typical treatment for early
offenders because their age and crime seemed trivial.

Recent research, however, indicates that these early starters are
in need of special attention (Loeber et al., 1998). Rather than follow
the tradition of nonintervention, the sites sought to bring early starters
in contact with a variety of services and build a web of support and
monitoring around these children. Howell (2001) for example, argues
that if one adopts successful interventions that use the early starter
as a focal point, then one can expect large yields in terms of
recidivism reduction.

Building a varied and extensive program network is an intermediate
step toward delivering the intensive programming and monitoring that
youth are likely to require for a successful intervention. Another
essential component of a network is the degree to which its members
agree upon program goals. As noted by Loeber and Farrington (2001),
information exchange and integration of services is essential for dealing
with child delinquents and, thus, is an appropriate focal point for
examining issues of implementation with regard to this target group.

## 13.3 Essential Elements for Programmatic Innovation

13.3.1 Integration of Key Policymakers (Stakeholders)

Terms such as *stakeholders* and *partners* have, to a large extent, become
part of the day-to-day jargon of many program managers. The reliance
on partnerships stems partly from the recognition that the synergy of
cooperation is necessary to overcome intractable problems. Sadd and
Grinc (1994, p. 41) note that " … no police department can do effective
and efficient problem solving without the active involvement of other
city agencies." This collaborative momentum has also been directly
influenced by grant-funding agencies that have placed increasing
emphasis on the identification and inclusion of key stakeholders.[1]
Implementing successful interventions is not only contingent upon
securing resources (e.g., grants) or having a vision for change, but on
ensuring collaboration and interlinkage with organizations that some-
times have competing organizational goals (see generally Scott, 1987).

From the perspective of traditional organizational theory, organizations are rational entities that create logical processes to achieve predetermined and agreed-upon outcome measures of success (Denhardt, 1993). In the case of organizations related to the juvenile justice system, the rational model would stipulate that multiple components of the system function to achieve system-level goals. Regardless of the rationale, organizations have a basic interest in cooperating with other agencies in which they have exchange relations (Hall, 1991). Yet, observations of organizations, especially police organizations, clearly indicate that there are often competing goals within and between organizations that thwart unified movement toward collaboration, cooperation, and partnership (Sadd and Grinc, 1994). Thus, integrating key stakeholders into decision-making processes is important to ensure follow-through with agreed-upon decisions. As noted previously, the variety of other organizations that are brought into the stakeholder status is important because child delinquents are likely to have expansive service needs. Additionally, the exchange relationship that develops in interorganizational relationships, especially in terms of resources that grantees can make available, should be considered important for understanding program implementation. Grantees willing to directly fund other stakeholders, for example, should be considered as building a stronger stakeholder web.

13.3.2 Communication and Shared Vision

Once the proper policymakers have been brought to the table, the next most important aspect is to ensure that core members have a sense of a shared vision about the fundamental purpose of the program, the causal processes underlying the problem, and the strategies that are most likely to create the intended change. Essentially, the *analysis* and *response* phases of the Eck and Spelman (1987) model must be agreed upon by the participants. The effect of integrating key policymakers who have a shared vision can be a powerful determinant of success. As noted by Klofas et al. (1990), however, law enforcement agencies are typically not effective in generating collaborative communication patterns. In order to create a sense of a shared vision, the planning process must be grounded in a conceptual understanding of the *causes* (analysis) of the problem, and there must be a close connection between these causes and the characteristics of types of treatment strategies (response).

Lack of information sharing tends to be one of the biggest impediments to successful planning and implementation of any program

(Slayton, 2000). At least two types of information sharing must be considered. The first we consider is *definitional* information. This comprises the nature of the problem and the nature of the solution as understood in the local context. Sharing and refining definitional information is essential for building a cooperative, interorganizational response to the problem. The second type of information is *technical* information, including criminal histories, school data, social-service information, and other records collected and maintained by government or private sources.[2]

Obstacles to gathering technical information can thwart the analysis component of an intervention because data are usually protected by federal, state, and local ordinances. For example, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974 placed strict guidelines over the dissemination of educational information to individuals outside the immediate school or school district. An approach that values the balance of technical information sharing with privacy can be effective in developing information sources. In contrast, an approach proceeding from the starting point that technical information sharing is inherently bad will likely fail. Educational institutions in all but one of the four sites, for example, were not data-sharing partners in the intervention because of broad institutional interpretation of the aforementioned FERPA statute.

Definitional information assembled by the grantees, from the standpoint of these four programs, was fairly similar across sites. The police agencies' problem-solving strategies yielded several "facts" from the analysis of technical data. First, youths aged 13 and under were at an elevated risk for becoming chronic delinquents if arrested for a serious nonviolent offense. Thus, a target group was defined in each city. Second, the definitional information drew upon the literature on the causes and correlates of delinquency, which has consistently demonstrated that early and serious offending is not only developmentally out of sequence, but that early offenders usually experience family, peer, school, and social problems that are considerably worse than those experienced by their peers. Acceptance of that definitional information by stakeholders at each site occurred in various settings with help from the Michigan State University technical assistance team.

Developing shared definitions of target populations and approaches to problems is consistent with Hall's (1991) conception of ideological consensus, which is an important environmental factor that influences interorganizational relationships. Specifically, he notes, in the context of police and social welfare agencies:

> Ideological issues can involve the compatibility of the goals
> of the organizations involved, conformity in terms of treat-
> ment ideologies in social service organizations, *or compati-*
> *bility in terms of understanding the nature of the issues faced.*
> The ideological issue becomes important in practice. For
> example, police agencies typically have a different ideology
> toward problem youth than do social welfare agencies. These
> differences, which can be severe or mild, affect the qualities
> of interactions among the organizations. (1991, p. 226; italics
> added for emphasis)

In summary, we argue that the success with which any site was
able to communicate and generate agreement about the definition of
the problem and its solution across organizational boundaries is an
important measure of implementation. The extent to which the analysis
and response to the problem are known outside (and, to some extent,
inside) the police agency is an important component of building an
interorganizational response to child delinquency. Those collaborations
in which definitional agreement is weak or nonexistent are unlikely
to achieve the comprehensive response that Howell (2001) suggests
is vital for handling the problems of child delinquents. In addition to
a shared conception of what the problem and response ought to be,
the complexity of the response, especially in light of the intricate
etiology of child delinquency, should be taken into consideration as
a measure of programmatic adequacy. Those programs that have a
greater specificity in terms of the problem statement and logic model
are likely to be more effective when compared with programs with
simplistic notions of the problems that face delinquents.

13.3.3 Assessment and Evaluation

Determining what actually "works" in terms of rehabilitating serious
juvenile offenders continues to pose one of the most significant chal-
lenges to policymakers. Indeed, as Lipsey and Wilson (1998, p. 314)
aptly observed, there is "little systematic attention … given to reviewing
the evidence for effectiveness with distinct types of offenders." As
such, from a programmatic point of view, the most important challenge
is planning for evaluation. Evaluation is, unfortunately, often an after-
thought that usually results in insufficient data collection during the
life of the program. It is important to stress that evaluation of the
program should remain at the forefront of the planning process and

at all subsequent stages of the intervention. In short, the viability of any evaluative effort is fundamentally dependent on the quality of the information collected prior to, during, and immediately following the program. Both process and outcome measures must be collected to best understand which methods prove effective.

A primary outcome element of this evaluation was assessed through the collection of detailed information on the individuals involved in the program and their response to the services provided. As noted, the purpose of the intervention project was to provide comprehensive intervention services to young, serious, first- or second-time offenders. As such, the program intended to provide services directed at the most basic causes of the problem (delinquency risk factors) and to inhibit program participants from maturing into more serious and chronic offenders. A comprehensive risk assessment was administered to all participants in the programs at or near intake to determine initial levels for risk. This risk assessment involved a structured interview including standard open- and closed-ended responses that identified constructs theoretically important to the onset and trajectory of delinquency careers (i.e., level of self-control, attitudes toward gangs, beliefs supporting aggression, attitudes toward school, and several measures of the familial bond). Follow-up interviews were also scheduled after 6 months and 12 months to discern any apparent subsequent reductions in risk. Because little is known about the treatment of child delinquency, tracking individual outcomes is truly an essential element of such a program (Loeber and Farrington 2001).

Additionally, each site was trained to collect data about the extent of program services, including frequency and type of contacts with program staff and extent of each juvenile's participation in specific program services. Other data were also collected at each research site from court, social service, and school records.[3]

As mentioned, part of the problem-oriented policing approach is to determine whether interventions worked and what changes might enhance the effectiveness of the program. Agencies that are most committed to problem solving are likely to hold themselves accountable to success measures beyond receiving grant award monies. Thus, we argue that those grantees that provide more information flow about the program population through the facilitation of data collection are likely to keep a successful intervention intact after seed money evaporates. Conversely, agencies that implement programs and pay little attention to outcomes are unlikely to have the capacity to continue efforts once temporary funds are exhausted.

Table 13.1 Site Demographics, Size, and Awards

City	Population (2000}	Poverty Level(%)	Police Department Size	Total Grant (Approximate)
Lakeside	197,800	8.9	366	$775,000
Central City	119,128	14.6	261	$600,000
Motor City	124,943	13.1	321	$500,000
Riverside	61,799	13.9	136	$465,000

Note: The average poverty level for the United States is 12.4 percent.

13.4 Site Descriptions

As discussed earlier, four police departments were invited to participate in the Michigan Juvenile Intervention Initiative (MJII). All of the police departments participating in this program were located in urban areas. A general description of the program models that were implemented in each site is given in the following text. In addition, general descriptive statistics as to the nature of the city and police department are included in Table 13.1.

The city of Lakeside is the largest city of the participating sites and, correspondingly, has the largest police department. The city has collaborated with several stakeholders to develop and implement a program model that melds intense supervision and monitoring with comprehensive programming and prosocial activities. The intervention group is unique for this project in that only second-time offenders (between the ages of 10 and 13) who were arrested for a serious, nonviolent offense are enrolled in the program. The intervention program has four main components, including an established partnership with the probation department to provide both intensive monitoring and social services to all participants in the program. In addition, civilian surveillance officers are employed by the grant and are responsible for contacting the juveniles at multiple points during the day. A third component includes attendance at one of two recreational program centers provided by the city (or other suitable program as determined by the court) as a condition of probation. Finally, an additional officer on the habitual offender team coordinates police

activity with the Community Policing and Probation program and provides beat officers with updated information on juvenile offenders. Because of the depth of the programming provided in Lakeside, the site was also eligible to receive the largest amount of funding.

The Central City police department program has also developed from a preexisting partnership between the police department and probation. The staff funded by the grant is responsible for intensive supervision. In addition, the probation officer works to link youth with comprehensive services including drug testing and treatment and psychological counseling. This program is also unique in that a family counseling component is provided to families in need. Finally, the program is intended to create positive change in educational experiences by connecting students to tutoring and mentoring programs available through the local school district.

The Motor City intervention program is police-centered. Juveniles enrolled in this program, unlike those in the other sites, are not formally charged and the program serves as a quasi-diversion program. The program model is centered primarily on services provided through the Motor City Police Athletic League (PAL). Each program participant is expected to participate each day in the after-school programming offered at the PAL office. Three types of programming are provided including general recreation, biweekly group counseling sessions with a psychologist, and life-skills training provided by a local community group.

The Riverside Police Department program, also police-centered, includes both monitoring and service provision. The program is unique in that only males are eligible to participate. Individuals in the program are assigned to a probation officer and are referred to intensive programming services through this department. Programming addresses the problems of substance abuse, negative peer association, and poor educational achievement. The police officers employed by this program are responsible for providing strict monitoring of the enrolled youth.

13.5 Data and Methods

The four research sites have been in regular contact with the research team since the spring of 1999. Interviews were conducted with core staff (primarily grant-funded personnel) during periods of program observation in 2001 and 2002. These staff members acted as informants for key program participants in other agencies. This "snowball" type sample, based on informants, yielded 33 interviews with stakeholders across the

four sites. The number of interviews ranged from 6 in Riverside to 11 in Lakeside. Interviews were semistructured and occurred in person and over the telephone. Analysis of the interviews produced measures of the varieties of stakeholders, the level of knowledge about the program that had passed from the police agency to the stakeholders, and the level of financial support that was extended from the grant recipients to other stakeholders. To augment the interviews, we also analyzed the grant applications from each department submitted in the fiscal year 2001 to determine the complexity of the problem definition and response generated by each site. Additionally, several meetings were convened throughout the program period where key personnel from each site were invited to report on progress.

13.5.1 Measures

A measure of the *varieties of stakeholders* indicates the number of different agency types that are partners with the delinquency intervention efforts in each of the cities. This measure is consonant with our first key element, which centers on integrating key stakeholders. Programs with more breadth are likely to be better able to provide for the service needs of child delinquents, which, as noted by Howell (2001), tend to be greater than typical delinquent youths.[4]

Stakeholder funding was coded from the interviews and grant applications and indicated whether the grant resources were used to support the home agency of the stakeholder. This effort indicated that unfunded stakeholders, funded stakeholders, and contractual stakeholders were considered partners with the four sites. Exchange relationships built on a funded interaction are likely to represent higher-quality interactions between agencies and lead to more elaborate analysis of the problem and collaborative solutions.

Stakeholder knowledge was coded as the level of knowledge that the interviewee had about the program. The coding was conducted as follows: 0 indicates that the interviewee was unclear or unfamiliar with the program; 1 indicates that the interviewee knows of the project (e.g., site-specific name) and that the program is focused on child delinquents; 2 indicates that the interviewee knows the target group and some activities that occur with youths; and 3 indicates that the interviewee has knowledge of program goals, target youths, and current activities. Where there is greater ideological consensus, the grantee has achieved greater acceptance of the definition of the problem (assessment) and the treatment strategy (response).

Complexity of the logic model was examined using grantee applications for fiscal years 2000–2002. Grant applications and corresponding problem statements and program models were analyzed for mention of key domains for early intervention. Five domains were examined including antisocial behavior, substance abuse, positive peer association, family problems, and school success. It is important to note that although a program may attempt to address a number of domains, the quality and intensity of the intervention is still likely to have a large impact on the outcome of participants (e.g., Lipsey and Wilson, 1998).

Assessment effort is measured using two sources. First, the total number of youths who received a risk-assessment survey is computed across each site. This was derived from records kept by the MSU research team and is not entirely reliable because it is partially dependent upon the cooperation of program juveniles. Second, and within the control of each department, we measured the completeness of the data collected on individuals at each site. Reasonably complete records, including contact and program information, were considered adequate data collection for evaluation. Overall, sites that are more committed to data collection are more likely to be dedicated to understanding whether and where program failure occurred. As such, one would argue that those sites are more attuned to the SARA model.

AU: Acronym not expanded.

13.5.2 Analysis

Analysis of grants from the four sites and interview results yield interesting findings regarding the various dimensions of the problem-solving activity outlined earlier. We found wide variation with respect to the variety of stakeholders and the support that is given to partnerships as one might expect from a SARA approach to early delinquency (see Table 13.2). The approach in Lakeside incorporated a large number of different stakeholders within and outside the police department, including probation, prosecution, and recreation. In addition, the Lakeside Police Department funded the greatest number of partnerships through direct grant funding, including money for court and recreation personnel. The Central City model of problem solving also involved an array of external partnerships. In this city, however, the court was the sole partner funded directly through the grant. All other partnerships were contractual, whereby the grantee paid user fees for services. Neither Motor City nor Riverside had a grant-funded partner, though Motor City had a fair number of external relationships

Table 13.2   Stakeholder Funding and Knowledge of Program

Site/Stakeholders	Number Interviewed	Mean Knowledge	Funding Source
Lakeside			
Police department	3	3.00	Grant-funded
Family court/probation	3	3.00	Grant-funded
Recreation	3	2.33	Grant-funded
Prosecutor	2	0.00	Unfunded
Total nonpolice (external)	8	2.00	Grant-funded (2)
Central City			
Police department	1	3.00	Grant funded
Family court/probation	1	3.00	Grant funded
Counseling	3	0.33	Contractual
Community mental health	1	2.00	Contractual
Other[a]	1	0.00	Contractual
Total nonpolice (external)	6	1.00	Grant-funded (1)
Motor City			
Police department	2	2.50	Grant funded
Family court/probation	1	1.00	Unfunded
Counseling	3	1.33	Contractual
Other[b]	3	1.33	Unfunded
Total nonpolice (external)	7	1.14	Grant funded (0)
Riverside			
Police department	1	3.00	Grant-funded
Family court/probation	4	1.50	Unfunded
Total nonpolice (external)	4	1.50	Grant-funded (0)

[a] Drug-testing personnel.

[b] One school official and two community leaders (one from Weed and Seed and one from a soup kitchen).

developed beyond the family court. Those relationships largely involved counselors who serviced youths on a contract basis.

With respect to levels of program knowledge, we found that most stakeholders we interviewed (outside of the police departments) lacked intimate knowledge of the programs. In terms of the complexity of approach, as measured by the risk factors attended to by the program model, we found that the sites generally took a multifactor approach.

Lakeside clearly led all four sites in effectively communicating the definition of the problem to those outside the immediate police department. On average, the external stakeholders in Lakeside scored a 2.00 on our scale (mean knowledge, Table 13.2), indicating familiarity with the program. Especially encouraging is the fact that those stakeholders from the Lakeside recreation programs who were interviewed scored a 2.33 on that measure. Riverside's external level of knowledge was the next highest at 1.50, which indicates incomplete communication (outside of the police department). It is important to note that Riverside's external interviewees came entirely from the family court where scores indicating complete familiarity with the program among stakeholders had been obtained in Lakeside and Central City. Central City and Motor City had respective scores of 1.00 and 1.14 in communicating their program-model goals and definitions to external stakeholders. It is interesting to note, especially with regard to counselors in contractual relationships, that the communication of the program model was noticeably absent in both sites. In Central City, however, the grant-funded stakeholder in their family court had a score of 3.00 for program familiarity.

Complexity of program model is an indicator of the comprehensive approach that the sites implemented to deal with child delinquency. Central City's program model addressed four of the five risk factors, Riverside and Lakeside three risk factors, and Motor City only addressed peer association and antisocial behavior (see Table 13.3).

The results presented in Table 13.4 indicate that there were large differences in sites' commitment to data collection. Motor City, for example, had a 92 percent completion rate for participant surveys; however, they collected no on-site data for their program. Therefore, program data are not available to determine whether intensity influences outcomes. Conversely, Central City collected contact information for 75 percent of the program participants but only facilitated interviews with 68 percent. At the extremes, Lakeside had high levels of data collection on both measures whereas Riverside had low levels on both, including 41 percent of the surveys completed and 38 percent of the basic on-site information collected.

Table 13.3   Risk Factors for Intervention

| | Domains for Intervention | | | | |
Site	Antisocial Behavior	Substance Abuse	Positive Peer Association	Family Problems	School Success
Lakeside		×	×		×
Central City	×	×		×	×
Motor City	×		×		
Riverside		×	×		×

Table 13.4   Site Evaluation Efforts

City	Total Number of Juveniles	Completed 1st Interviews[a]	Basic Information Collected[b]	Contact Information Collected[b]	Juveniles Dismissed to Date[c]
Lakeside	84	62 (74%)	77 (92%)	60 (71%)	39 (46%)
Central City	60	41 (68%)	45 (75%)	56 (93%)	24 (40%)
Motor City	26	24 (92%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	17 (65%)
Riverside	37	15 (41%)	14 (38%)	19 (51%)	16 (43%)

[a] Although the evaluation team conducted these interviews, program administrators at each site were responsible for ensuring that program youth were available to be interviewed on specified days.

[b] Each individual site is responsible for collecting this information, entering it into an Access database, and forwarding it to the evaluation team.

[c] Dismissed due to program completion or discharged due to a violation of program rules.

Overall, it appears that two sites, Central City and Lakeside, were able to integrate segments of the service community into a complex and varied response to early childhood delinquency. The other two sites, Motor City and Riverside, exemplify agencies that were less able to formulate a solid response to their problem statement, especially

with regard to external collaboration. Their approaches recognized the complexity of the situations confronted by childhood delinquents, but they failed to integrate those needs into a multiagency collaboration. Unlike the tactic suggested by Sadd and Grinc (1994), where police agencies must seek to build partnerships outside their agencies, these two sites essentially adopted an independent approach. Both utilized police as mentors to the youths, and neither had sufficiently detailed plans for execution or significant cooperation from agencies experienced in dealing with juveniles (e.g., the courts and probation). Thus, complexity without cooperation or effective communication patterns with external agencies cuts down on the innovation that these two programs can bring to the youths they serve.

From numerous hours of on-site observation, technical assistance, and evaluation research, it appears that innovations that target child delinquents are likely to require preexisting and, perhaps, co-funded relationships between the juvenile court and the police. In Lakeside and Central, where youths arguably have the greatest exposure to services (both through police funding and through programs that courts may have available for young offenders), the partnership between courts and police has been formalized and is supported by grant money that passes through the police department. It should be noted that the cooperation between these agencies existed prior to the introduction of grant funding, but the problem of child delinquency was not the focus of that interaction. In the latter two sites, the partnership with the courts was informal to nonexistent. By failing to partner successfully with an outside agency, these two sites offer limited breadth of programming for the youth that they serve.

One is likely inclined to argue that we have ordinally ranked four sites on implementation, but we have not spoken of the issue of outcomes for youths in these programs. Given the limited space, we can say that the same ranking holds in terms of services received by youths (McCluskey, 2002). Lakeside and Central City provide high levels of service to their youths, whereas the latter two sites keep minimal records on services provided. In addition, limited data on frequency of contacts indicate that the relationship between program intensity (nearly daily contact in Lakeside and somewhat lower levels in Central City and Riverside) and the web of informed stakeholders also is directly and positively associated. If one accepts the importance of program intensity and comprehensiveness of service for these youths, then these implementation patterns will be important to policy makers and service providers alike. One optimistic observation that

we have made is that sites which are likely to effectively implement programs appear willing to expend energy on documenting extensively the actions taken with individual clients (a necessary element of a comprehensive evaluation and program revision).

13.6 Conclusion

In the preceding text, we have outlined several elements that are starting points for building comprehensive partnerships among criminal justice agencies and service providers to deal with child delinquents and their problems. Our observations and interviews reveal that preexisting partnerships among agencies and a shared commitment to the definition of a problem, as well as routes to the solution, are the *sine qua non* of building more comprehensive early juvenile interventions. A more general statement about the funding of innovative programming is suggested. Partnerships that are fashioned from the necessities of grant requirements are unlikely to germinate programs that are problem focused and more likely to result in efforts to maintain funding. Despite the effort of building a coalition through the problem-solving process for 1 year of grant funding, two of the sites were unable to successfully partner with other criminal justice agencies. The two agencies that did successfully incorporate the juvenile court and probation into the program already had a preexisting level of interagency cooperation. Moving across an interagency boundary to address a novel issue such as child delinquency requires an unfunded cooperation, because funding itself does not appear to be useful in encouraging interagency cooperation. This suggests that models such as the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) built from the Boston and Indianapolis violence-reduction models (Kennedy, 1997; McGarrellet al., 2002), which bring agencies together under an umbrella of problem identification and implementation of a comprehensive solution (e.g., Bynum, 2001), serve as an alternative to the "ready, fire, aim" approach noted by Sherman, 2001.

Preliminary analysis of the level and intensity of contacts and varieties of services that individual youth receive in each of these four programs indicates that they are ordinally ranked according to the level of comprehensiveness and goal sharing among stakeholders at each site (McCluskey, 2002). Preliminary analyses of the most integrated site indicate that the Lakeside program has substantially reduced recidivism among youthful offenders (Bynum, 2002; Patchin, 2002).

13.6.1 Future Directions

The initial reaction to these results is that the acquisition of sufficient resources has been erroneously omitted from the analysis. Contrary to common sense, resource availability was not placed on the list of crucial elements. Yet, after 5 years of participation in the MJII program, our collective experiences firmly indicate that resources were, in reality, not as important as many had originally anticipated. More crucial was the inclusion of the key policymakers, a sense of shared vision, and the will to make change happen. Innovation was possible in agencies in which innovation and creativity were fostered as part of the normal routines of the organization. Inter- and intra-agency conflict and failure appeared to be justified on the "lack of resources" thesis. Not surprisingly, two agencies made little to no progress in establishing creative, innovative responses to delinquency even after being provided liberal access to substantial sums of grant dollars and a full research team to assist with implementation issues.

As noted by Loeber and Farrington (2001), there is a need for understanding what does not work just as much as there is a need for finding solutions to problems. Documenting future efforts at early intervention across multiple sites is useful for understanding how programs fail. Had fewer sites been chosen, one might have formed a mistaken impression about how successful police can be in partnering and problem-solving issues such as early juvenile delinquency. Consonant with that conclusion, we argue that greater attention must be paid to the outcomes that youths had in these programs. In a time of scarce grant resources, implementation and outcome measures must be collected to ensure that an effective program is continued and ineffective programming is eliminated (Maxfield, 2001).

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
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Notes

1. Many programs funded through the U.S. Department of Justice's grant dissemination agencies make specific requirements or strongly encourage the identification and inclusion of appropriate policymakers in the planning process. For example, many documents distributed by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) intended to assist practitioners in implementing successful programs specifically identify this as a key ingredient to success (Cohen, 2001).

2. The aggregation of this technical information, in the cases of the juvenile intervention projects, is what led to the definitional information about early starters and their problems at the local level. This dichotomy is a device for differentiating agency data (arrests, grades, etc.) from information that is interpreted by the stakeholders. In this case, the data were interpreted to mean that intervention with child delinquents would be warranted.

3. School records proved to be the most difficult data to obtain; we were only able to gain access to this data in one city.

4. It should be noted that, although the initial contact was in the police agency, each respondent was queried for other contacts that serve key roles in dealing with the youth in the program. This ensured that service to youth that might have been "hidden" from the police in terms of daily working of the program would be uncovered by the snowball method.